

HESITATION, INDECISION OR ASTUTENESS? THE FOREIGN POLICY OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY IN 1912–1913 BASED ON THE DIARY OF LAJOS THALLÓCZY

Gábor Demeter

Lajos *Thallóczy*, this late theoretic of Hungarian foreign policy entered into the political life in 1886, when he began to work as a secretary of Benjámín Kállay, who was then Austria-Hungary's minister of finance and governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This experience determined his political views. In 1908 he became head of department at Austria-Hungary's Joint Ministry of Finance; during the Balkan Wars he was promoted Real Internal Privy Counselor. Shortly thereafter Thallóczy entered the department of 3rd rank – the highest official level for a civil servant in the Monarchy. In 1915–16, he was the civil counselor of the military administration in occupied Serbia.¹

Although he was a civil servant of the joint ministries, he tried to promote the foreign political interests of a Hungarian pressure group represented by Count István Tisza, Prime Minister from 1913 and Baron István Burián, Joint Minister of Finance 1903–1912.² He was clever enough to remain in shade and influence politics behind the scene. As a disciplined historian and well-known albanologist he has unchallenged merits in creating the independent Albania.³ He wrote the first concise Albanian history (also used by pupils!) translated by his agent, Zef Zurani to Albanian. He was the first western scholar, who tried to create the myth of Skanderbeg as an anti-Turkish Christian hero (after the attempt of Albanian Pashko Vasa in 1879)⁴, serving as an instrument for the unification of the Albanian nation. The idea to create a nation based on common language, thus diminishing the role of religious differences and in this way diverging Albanians from the Ottomans was also his initiative. Geographer-adventurers with good local connections, like Baron Ferenc Nopcsa⁵ who collected information about the internal situation in Albania were among his students.⁶ He also had field experience: when the soldiers and civil servants of Austria-Hungary were sent on holiday, their task was regularly to collect as many data as possible. In the summer of 1913 his task was to describe Albanian internal situation⁷: in order to avoid any suspect, he travelled through Russia (where he collected statistical data on Łódź and other Polish industrial cities)⁸, was shipped in Constantinople, passed around Greece with his agents to reach his final destination. His mission was so confidential, that he did not put down the achievements in his diary, which is – compared to other talkative

parts – a rare occasion. The above mentioned Zurani contributed to smuggling weapons into Albania with the knowledge of Austrian authorities. Thus beyond the scientific circle an unofficial 'secret service' was working around him.⁹ His talent was also appreciated by Rappaport and Ippen, official delegates of Austria-Hungary in London sent for the delimitation of Albania.¹⁰ It was Thallóczy indeed who offered proposals for Albanian borders and for possible territorial concessions given to its neighbours.¹¹

The 'triumvirate' of Tisza, Burián and Thallóczy was following the concept of Andrassy and Kállay. As an albanologist, Thallóczy had a crucial role in creating a political program for this lobby: while the Austrian war-party of Conrad was focusing on the destruction of Serbia and Italy, the Hungarian group wanted to shift the sphere of influence of Austria-Hungary from the Morava-Vardar axis to the Albanian coast. Owing to the strong Russian support, this group refrained from the integration of Serbia into the economic sphere of Austria-Hungary, thus reaching Saloniki (anyway the incorporation or annihilation of Serbia would have meant trialism, that the Hungarian elite feared more, than a war with Russia). They thought that the creation of Albania and its connection to the Bosnian railways might also secure Austro-Hungarian economic outlet and in that case Italy would be unable to close down the Otranto Strait. The creation of Albania became of primary importance during the Balkan Wars, that is why Austria-Hungary insisted on Serbia leaving the coast. As a recompensation Macedonia was offered, because the exacerbation of Bulgarian-Serbian antagonism was also another instrument which was utilized by this group. They even wanted to substitute or check the reluctant Romania with a Bulgarian-Austrian cooperation.¹² Nevertheless the competition between the different pressure groups decreased the efficiency of Austria-Hungary's foreign policy in 1912–1913.

Thallóczy's diary is of primary importance for the examination of the diplomacy of the Dual Monarchy, because he was present not only at the official assemblies of the delegates, but was also invited to informal meetings where most of the brainstorming took place. Through his friends he was able to collect information about many rumours, personal interests and even antagonisms that formed the official policy of Austria-Hungary behind the curtains. In this sense his diaries provide us much more, that can be reconstructed from officially published documents like the "Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik". Nevertheless, as being the member of a political pressure group that temporarily lost its influence in 1912–1913, he could not remain impartial when writing his accounts and giving an analysis of decisions made.

Contrary to Burián, who wrote his diary to himself in order to explain and confirm his thoughts and deeds, and definitely not to the broad publicity, Thallóczy decided to write his memoirs as a publicist. Being disappointed from the in-

ternal and external political failures of Austria-Hungary, he dared criticize his opponents and political comrades in a sharp tone, although he knew it well, that his documents (after deciphered by his secretary János Peregrényi) would be used by the forthcoming generation as a valuable document of that era. His writing is full of anecdotes, stories alternating with strict facts and numbers. This uneasy personality was a 'real Hungarian' regarding his psychical features – he wrote very pessimistically.¹³ Reading his detailed accounts one may come to the conclusion that the collapse of the overbureaucratized and Austria-Hungary was necessary and inevitable.

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When Berchtold became the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1912 after the sudden death of Aehrenthal, it also meant that the political influence of Hungarians lost ground and they were pulled out from decision-making (none of the three joint ministers represented Hungarian goals then). The growing conceptual and personal difference between the Hungarian pressure group and Berchtold soon became evident. Berchtold criticized Aehrenthal's policy regarding the annexation and the railway-question, claiming that these adventures had ruined the prestige of and trust toward Austria-Hungary¹⁴, and Aehrenthal was usually influenced by the concept of Burián, that time Joint Minister of Finance and Governor of Bosnia.¹⁵ After the death of the previous – in a very critical period –, and the dismissal of the latter (he was substituted by the Polish Bilinski)¹⁶ nobody represented Hungarian interests at the highest levels. When finally the third from the 'triumvirate', Count Tisza became Prime Minister of Hungary in 1913, he was suffering from lack of information in foreign political questions. Although he had a clear concept to win Bulgaria as an ally in return for the loss of Romania, he had definitely no instruments to realize this, until Burián was appointed as a Mediating Minister between Francis Joseph and the Hungarian government. In this way direct influence on decision-makers was restored.

For Thallóczy it seemed that the new Minister of Foreign Affairs had no clear concept on what to do in case of the probable collapse of Turkey – he was only good at criticizing his predecessor. In his opinion Berchtold lacked strong will and was to pursue a reactive and not a proactive-preventive foreign policy. This annoyed Thallóczy's circles.¹⁷ Berchtold's idea was simple according to the malicious Hungarian: he wanted to put as many soldiers as possible along the border, but for this he needed money.¹⁸ Unfortunately he did not recognise that question of military power is determined partly by the calamities of Hungarian internal affairs.

The first rumours about the Balkan League reached Thallóczy on 19 September. Austrian diplomats were erroneously convinced that it was an anti-Turkish

alliance created by Charikov¹⁹, and they did not know anything at all about its existing anti-Austrian character. Thallóczy admitted on 1st October that the Balkan states tricked not only Austria-Hungary, but Russia, the creator of the Balkan Alliance too.²⁰ Although the occupation of Belgrade immediately arose in certain Viennese circles to halt the evolution of events, Thallóczy and his comrades thought that it would mean a war with Russia, therefore refrained from preventive measures. They were convinced that after the Balkan war the showdown between the two great alliance systems would come next. The fear from Russia and the war mesmerized the Austrian diplomacy.²¹ Thallóczy recognized that Berchtold was unable to endure the burden: neither he wanted to undertake the responsibility for initiating a war, nor to be labelled as the one who did nothing at all. Berchtold is a great lord but a weak hand – summarized Thallóczy his conversation with the foreign minister. Although the soldiers were not zealous for the occupation of Novipazar calling it a foxtrap, Thallóczy warned, that linking Novipazar to the Bosnian railways (which were just under negotiation) would be advantageous in the future either to enhance connections with Albanian lands or to promote the way to Saloniki bypassing Serbia.²²

Thallóczy realized quite early, that Turkey became on the brink of collapse by November, 1912²³ and this required the reorientation of Berchtold's foreign policy that did not calculated with the Turkish defeat.²⁴ He did not believe that the localization plans of the Powers and their insist on status quo would work at all, because Bulgaria would never accept this after a victorious war, powers could only block the sea and not the inland, and an unilateral Austrian action only would be possible against Serbia, which Russia would never tolerate.²⁵ Thallóczy remained sceptic arguing that the concert of Powers had never worked and it only resulted territorial losses for Turkey. (7-8 October, 1912).²⁶ Having free access to secret military reports Thallóczy gives a typical example for the demoralization of Ottoman troops. The unpaid Moslem soldiers of Plevlje sold more than 25 thousand weapons to the Montenegrins, non-believers and future enemy just before the outbreak of hostilities, as the witnesses from the starving Turkish troops numbering 1300 men retreated to Bosnia early in November, 1912 accounted.²⁷

Berchtold admitted, that the status quo could not be maintained any more, but he was still unable to give a clear concept. Thallóczy wrote sarcastically, that Austria-Hungary was the first one giving up the status quo unofficially, but the last one which accepted it officially.²⁸ We cannot bind ourselves to a cadaver – wrote Thallóczy – Austria lost a defense line by the collapse of Turkey, the southern borders became more vulnerable, since the new combinations are always more dangerous than old ones.²⁹

During the days of brainstorming among many ideas the question of the occupation of Albania arose to secure Austrian interests opposed to the Serbian ad-

vance to the Adriatic.³⁰ A possible Albanian and Montegrin union was refused by Thallóczy, such as giving Scutari to Montenegro.³¹ Rappaport warned that cutting all connections between Ottomans and Albania might anger Moslem Albanians, therefore instead of independence the autonomy of Albania was proposed. The Germans warned that giving back the Sanjak of Novipazar was a mistake, because it made impossible to reach Albania through Bosnia.³² Everybody was saying what had to be done instead of telling what is to be done now in the Foreign Ministry – wrote Thallóczy, although he admitted that the Germans were right.³³

Another interesting episode regarding the Albanian question and the shortage of qualified and capable decision-makers was also mentioned by Thallóczy in May 1913. He criticized sharply the idea that the consuls of the 6 powers were planned to be the head of the controlling committee in Albania, because it would only result in rivalry and indecision.³⁴ Neither Rappaport nor Ippen had idea how to create a temporary government in Albania with real executive power, without influence and lacking basic institutions. Thallóczy offered to keep the government in Valona, expanded and supervised by the delegates of the Powers.³⁵ He claimed, that Ippen had no elaborate plan, he was just an executer of decision-makers, who also did not have a clear insight of the events. Berchtold finally called Thallóczy in to ask for his proposals. Somebody advised Berchtold to search for a Catholic ruler for Albania and not a Protestant, arguing that Moslems prefer faithful believers, than heretics. Thallóczy warned Berchtold, that most of the Albanian Moslems were bektashi, which almost equaled with 'free masonry and heresy' according to an eager Muslim.³⁶ Northern Albanians are Catholics only on paper, they are very far away from real confession. A catholic ruler would mean nothing for these tribal people who would only listen to the local priests, but could exacerbate religious differences suppressed up to now. Middle Albanians are rather patriots than Moslems, but each wanted to be the leader of the country, while orthodox southern Albanians could become Serbs or Greeks easily depending on who pays more. Berchtold was astonished by the account of Thallóczy, who also warned that the positions of Wied were very weak, he would be expelled from the country according to his informations. Thallóczy pointed out ironically that a woman would be the best solution, because Albanians would not harm her according to their traditions. Berchtold complained that Ippen wanted to work on international basis that hindered the promotion of Austrian interests, while Thallóczy replied, that Ippen just told him the opposite. Berchtold was surprised and finally turned out, that nobody gave him proper information about what was going on at lower levels (31 May, 1913).

The above mentioned episodes prove that diplomats were embarrassed indeed – it was rumoured that the heir apparent wanted war with the Serbs, but peace with the Russians, which seemed to be an impossible combination. If Serbian

presence at the Adriatic led to war it would attract the intervention of Russia leading to the escalation of the conflict (7 November 1912).³⁷ The Serbian victory even contributed to the settling of the long disputed railway question in Bosnia and mitigating the debate between the Austrian and Hungarian party that both wanted to secure the iron-mines themselves.³⁸

Contrary to the opinion of the Ballhausplatz, Count Tisza did not consider the results of the Balkan War dangerous for Austria-Hungary, indeed he thought it was quite useful, because it ended a stalemate and made the realization of the plans regarding Albania possible. From economic aspects the leading Hungarian geographer, Lajos Lóczy also saw the collapse of Turkey advantageous, because as he pointed out, Hungary needed more raw material for its industry, and while the Bosnian iron ore was enough for 80 years, Hungary needed more coal (18–20, November, 1912).³⁹ Lóczy thought that obtaining economic concessions on the ruins of Ottoman Turkey would become easier. But anyway, most of the Hungarians lost their belief in the future partly because of the war, partly because of the critical internal political situation. The public opinion became very pessimistic, since the spiritless hesitation of the diplomats influenced the public opinion through the press.⁴⁰ Conrad claimed that the hesitant policy of Berchtold would ruin the moral of the army.⁴¹ The financial agony even worsened the situation. The mobilization in Bosnia cost 240 thousand francs daily with no result, except the loss of prestige, internal and international trust. The constant governmental crisis made Hungary ridiculous.⁴² The Tatars are eating up each other – wrote Thallóczy about the Hungarian elite.⁴³ The dilettantism and the lack of cooperation among high-rank officials angered the publicity further: the joint minister of War, Auffenberg, increased the number of soldiers contrary to the will of Berchtold, and he was soon dismissed.⁴⁴ Even the bankers began to think that a war would profit more, than a peace like this⁴⁵: the mobilization of the forces cost altogether 1 billion francs for Austria-Hungary in the two Balkan Wars without any materialized result, while the whole budget of the state reached 6 billion.⁴⁶ This amount almost equaled with that of Bulgaria, which fought two wars! The German ambassador, Tschirschky pointed out on 9, November 1912, that Germany is ready to march with Austria-Hungary, but the leader diplomats were still saying what they do not want, instead of telling what they want.⁴⁷ The country was so powerless and apathic, that an energetic conqueror could take over power easily, like it happened to Turkey – wrote Thallóczy.⁴⁸

The group of Conrad and Krobatin wanted war against Serbia, partly to restore prestige, partly because the moral of the army declined quickly, but Berchtold resisted according to Thallóczy “since no Power in Europe wanted war and plundering a carcass is not a honor”. The soldiers finally in November, 1912 decided themselves to occupy the Sanjak of Novipazar in order to create a com-

mon border with Albania. But Thallóczy told, that it was then too late, because the negotiations for the armistice between the fighting parties seemed to be successful: such a decision should have been made earlier.⁴⁹ Francis Joseph pointed out that if the Serbs did not withdraw from Durazzo, that would mean war, but Austria-Hungary did not want to initiate preventive war without any Serbian insult that could serve as a good reason.⁵⁰ A good occasion occurred for the showdown, when the Serbian troops insulted Prohaska, consul of Austria-Hungary. Thallóczy mentioned, that the Russian Tzar had written a letter to Francis Joseph, in which he pointed out that such an insult would require a revenge and in that case Russia would not intervene.⁵¹ According to Thallóczy this was the moment when the bombardment of Belgrade would not have caused a diplomatic incident. But after this, without serious reasons an intimidation of Serbs would have been equal with an aggression – analysed the situation Krobatin, the new joint minister of War. Since most of the high-ranked military officers wanted trialism,⁵² Thallóczy, who represented Hungarian interests, deeply despised them.

The war and peace parties were still unable to reach an agreement on foreign political questions. When the Turks wanted to smuggle 30 thousand weapons to Albania through Zef Zurani, an agent of Thallóczy, the authorities of Austria-Hungary were hesitating to forward them because they received contradictory orders from the two parties, however this amount of weapons would have kept off Montenegrins from Scutari and would have promoted the Albanian position of Austria-Hungary.⁵³ The same situation – even more ridiculous – took place, when Hasan Prishtina managed to escape from his Serbian prison in Belgrade, but the Hungarian authorities denied him to enter the country without papers – however he could have mobilized Albanians in Kosova thus creating difficulties for the Serbs.


Finally Austria-Hungary decided to declare her demands against Serbia which have been never realized: (1) official renouncement from Bosnia, (2) full-scale prohibition of the activity of the Narodna Odbrana, (3) recompensation of Austria-Hungary in the sanjak of Novipazar (Plevlje, Priepolje), (4) joint shipping on river Drina, (5) the acquisition of Mt. Lovčen from Montenegro, (6) building of Užice-Vardište line by Serbia that connects Bosnia with Serbia, creating a link towards river Morava, (7) free trade till 1917, then customs union with Serbia and Montenegro, (8) the creation of a Sarajevo-Mitrovica-Saloniki railroad by Austrian entrepreneurs within 6 years without Serbian objection.⁵⁴ This proposal was elaborated by Bilinski, Joint Minister of Finance, chief of Thallóczy, who wanted to push Berchtold toward a more active foreign policy, like Burián did the same, when Aehrenthal was in charge. But Berchtold resisted to execute the plan.

Thallóczy clearly recognised the problem of the Romanian compensation and the hesitation of the Bulgarians early in 1913 – he claimed that the Romanians

would penetrate into Bulgaria, if they lost their patience (nevertheless they would not have tried it without Russian encouragement contrary to Thallóczy's belief)⁵⁵. He also recognised that Greece and Serbia would be a natural enemy of Bulgaria, therefore if the Serbs refused the Austrian demands, Austria-Hungary should promote the interests of Bulgaria⁵⁶, as it would be also a good instrument to balance Russian influence over peninsula. This was the concept of the Hungarian pressure group of Tisza, Burián and Thallóczy, which also wanted to check Romania – that showed russophile tendencies, since Russians promised them Transylvania⁵⁷ – with Bulgaria. This raised a serious problem, since the Germans wanted to keep the benevolent alliance of Romania (and also tried to convince the Hungarians to give southern Transylvania to Romania) and Berchtold started to balance between the two concepts. Tarnowski, ambassador in Sofia added further, that the Bulgarians would be the natural enemies of Serbia, even if their dreams about Macedonia remained unfulfilled, therefore the realization of Greater Bulgaria is not essential.⁵⁸ So, Austria-Hungary offered Serbia to obtain Macedonian territories as compensation for their withdrawal from the Adriatic. That's also one reason for the weak Austrian support of Bulgarian claims during the negotiations of the Bucharest Peace Treaty, the second one is, that Romania was backed both by Russia and Germany, and the latter did not take into consideration Hungarian interests. It was Germany indeed – claimed Thallóczy – that gave free hand to Romania⁵⁹, while Bulgaria was reluctant to give any concessions – although Berchtold had been convincing them for 8 weeks – thus thwarting the policy of Austria-Hungary.

The diary contains an important element that puts the Bulgarian attack on Serbia during the second Balkan War into a different light. The journalist Richard von Mach claimed that Tzar Ferdinand attacked Serbia, because he hoped for an Austrian intervention.⁶⁰ French scholars also wrote, that Austria-Hungary encouraged the war in order to dismember Serbia.⁶¹ Recent studies seemed to deny this theory: Löding in her work mentions 50 million francs financial aid in case of war⁶², but no military aid. But reading Thallóczy's diary one may come to the conclusion, that the statements in early works are not completely groundless. Thallóczy wrote that Austria-Hungary promised the Bulgarians, that in case of a Serbo-Bulgarian war Austria would intervene, if the Bulgarians were defeated⁶³, and in that case Serbia would be dismembered between Romania, Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary.⁶⁴ Although officially published documents deny the possibility of an Austrian military intervention, even if this was an unofficial rumour, it could have influenced the behavior of Tzar Ferdinand.⁶⁵ Thallóczy was quite sceptic regarding a Serbo-Bulgarian war⁶⁶, and he wrote that neither Serbia, nor Bulgaria would do such a favour for Austria-Hungary to benefit from this event, anyway, neither parties had enough money to fight.⁶⁷ However, he also added, that for Balkan states money is not essential to fight a war (29 May, 1913).⁶⁸

Furthermore, the above mentioned were repeated on July 4, 1913 after the outbreak of hostilities, based on talks with Bilinski: if war broke out and Bulgaria was defeated and the Romanians crossed the line given to them in Dobruja⁶⁹, Austria-Hungary would intervene and attack Serbia in order to occupy the Sanjak of Novibazar creating a common border between Bosnia and Albania.⁷⁰ However, neither Berchtold, nor Francis Joseph was convinced by Bilinski, the above mentioned combinations are confirmed in the work of Conrad von Hötzendorf⁷¹, and also appear in the diary of Baernreither. The latter wrote that Berchtold had told these ideas to the German ambassador, Tschirschky⁷², who usually disinformed the Bulgarian ambassador in Vienna, Salabashev.⁷³ Therefore the thesis, that Tzar Ferdinand attacked Serbia without any (Austrian) encouragement is flawed, and documents put the question of his personal responsibility into a different light.



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sabb politika, mely ha igaz, csak pillanatnyi helyzetfel~~vet~~elt jelent. A lapok egész mást hoznak s a szerbek ~~nem~~ ~~sem~~ akarnak verekedni. De feljegyzem, mert ebben a zavaros evolúcióban mindent fel kell jegyezni. Holnapután megyek Hédervárra.

3/30. 1913. 20.


Elfelejtettem megírni, hogy Buriánt bizalmasan felszólították, hogy a török birodalom reformja alkalmából, mint egyik reformátor lépjen be. Természetesen hízelgett neki a dolog, de szó sincs róla, hogy elfogadja. Délután hívatott Lukács és ~~sem~~ ~~egy~~ ^{könnyűbélű} órát töltöttem nála délután 5-ig. Beszél-

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elérni. Egyszer a bulgárok engedtek, más-kor a románok makacsodtak és viszont, míg végre, amint hallom, a bulgárok bele-mentek a vorkjenoi /7/ szöglet átadásába, de most a románok elvesztették a türel-müket és nem engedik „Bulgáriát nagyra-nőni.” A hármasszövetségnek tehát ez a becses aggratuma ~~sem~~ ^{ne} ha nem is fordult ellene, mindamellett már velünk sincs.

Ma reggel, illetőleg tegnap este, azt telefonálta a külügyi kabinet, hogy ha a románok, kiknek ezt tanácsoljuk, átmen-nek a bulgárok engede vonalon és ha a bulgárokat a szerbek és görögök megverik, mi mozgósítunk és bevonulunk Szerbiába. .

Nemigen hittem ennek az értesítésnek, amely telefonon át ilyen határozott for-mát öltött. Ma azután Bilinski volt a külügyministernél majdnem egy óra hossz~~an~~ ^{at} Nagy fáradtan jött vissza és konstatal-



Thallóczy, IX/2. 581.

NOTES

- ¹ Szabó, D.: Lajos Thallóczy, als Zivillandeskommissär im besetzten Serbien. In: Ress, I. – Juzbašić, Dž. – Gottsman, A. (Hrsg.): Lajos Thallóczy der Historiker und Politiker. Sarajevo – Budapest, 2010, 171–180.
- ² For their political concept regarding the relationship between Austria and Hungary see: Somogyi, É.: Die Staatsrechtlichen Ansichten von Lajos Thallóczy. In: Ress, I. – Juzbašić, Dž. – Gottsman, A. (Hrsg.): Lajos Thallóczy der Historiker und Politiker. Sarajevo – Budapest, 2010, 115–128.
- ³ Csaplár-Degovics, K.: Ludwig von Thallóczy und die Albanologie: Skizzen eines Experiments zur Nationsbildung. In: Ress, I. – Juzbašić, Dž. – Gottsman, A. (Hrsg.): Lajos Thallóczy der Historiker und Politiker. Sarajevo – Budapest, 2010, 141–164.
- ⁴ Although recent studies has proved, that he was a quite controversial personality. Csaplár-Degovics, K.: Az albán nemzetévlás kezdetei (1878–1913). A Rilindja és az államalapítás korszaka. Budapest, 2010, 177–178.
- ⁵ Csaplár-Degovics, K.: Az albán nemzetévlás kezdetei (1878–1913). A Rilindja és az államalapítás korszaka. Budapest, 2010, 43.

See further: *Elsie, R.*: A Biographical Dictionary of Albanian History. London – New York, 2013, 335–337.

⁶ *Csaplár-Degovics, K.*: Az albán nemzetté válás kezdetei (1878–1913). A Rilindja és az államalapítás korszaka (The Beginnings of the Albanian Nation 1878–1913. The Rilindja and the Establishment of the State). Budapest, 2010, 176–177.

⁷ That is why he did not follow and comment the diplomatic achievements of the Bucharest Peace Treaty.

⁸ See: Országos Széchényi Könyvtár. (Széchényi National Library of Hungary) Kézirattár. Néhai Dr. Thallóczy Lajos osztályfőnök hátrahagyott iratai sztenographált részének átírása (Stenographic Documents from the Head of Department, Dr. Lajos Thallóczy). Bosniaca IX/3. 608–609, 613.

⁹ See his staying in Constantinople, *Thallóczy*, 641.

¹⁰ *Thallóczy*, IX/1. 544–545.

¹¹ *Thallóczy*, VIII/8. 365.

¹² For more details see: Báró Burián István naplói, 1907–1922. Báró Burián István távirati könyvei 1913–1915. A Magyarországi Református Egyház Zsinati Levéltárában. (The Diaries of Baron Burián István 1907–1922 in the Archives of the Hungarian Reformed Church.) Budapest, 1999.

¹³ By 1912 he became mentally and psychically tired, and constantly blamed others for the failures. He not only offended and insulted the Balkan nations with his strict and unjust words, but also his comrades, senior and superior officers in his diary – even the heir apparent. It is worth further investigation how a well-trained diplomat and official became frustrated under the heavy burden and the lack of success, and what threats it may impose on collective work. Thallóczy even used antisemitic tone owing to the frustration, that his social position did not change within the last ten years, however his talent and knowledge was utilized and exploited as well. But hardly any of his advices was realised. His desire was to become a baron, but he did not obtain the title, while he recognised, that many from the civil society in Budapest were assimilated easily and became member of the high-society. Remaining unrewarded, he felt his social position unstable as he experienced that many of his rivals overtook him in the competition for social safety and recognition.

¹⁴ *Thallóczy*, VIII/5. 213.

¹⁵ *Thallóczy*, IX/1. 445.

¹⁶ The reason of his dismissal was, that Berchtold was *de iure* Hungarian, and 2 Hungarians were not allowed to serve at the same time among the 3 joint ministers.

¹⁷ *Thallóczy*, VIII/5. 214.

¹⁸ *Thallóczy*, VIII/5. 213.

¹⁹ *Thallóczy*, VIII/6. 247.

²⁰ *Thallóczy*, VIII/6. 258.

²¹ *Thallóczy*, VIII/6. 262. Including the Hungarian Minister of Defense, Baron Hazay Samu.

²² *Thallóczy*, VIII/6. 247. 19.08.1912.

²³ When the newspapers wrote, that the Turks won – criticized the press Thallóczy ironically – one can be sure that the Bulgarians were the real winners (03.11. 1912). *Thallóczy*, VIII/7. 290.

²⁴ *Thallóczy*, IX/2. 571.

²⁵ *Thallóczy*, VIII/6. 262.

- ²⁶ *Thallóczy*, IX/1. 520. The reason of the Turkish defeat was given by the consul in Janina under the following points. (1) The Ottomans dismissed large number of soldiers, who had been serving for many years in the Tripolitanian war, just before the outbreak of the Balkan war. (2) Young Turk and conservative quarrels ruined the moral of the army. (3) Military supply was below any standard.
- ²⁷ *Thallóczy*, IX/1. 395.
- ²⁸ *Thallóczy*, VIII/7. 295.
- ²⁹ *Thallóczy*, VIII/7. 296.
- ³⁰ *Thallóczy*, VIII/7. 297.
- ³¹ *Thallóczy*, VIII/8. 374.
- ³² *Thallóczy*, VIII/7. 290. 02.11.1912.
- ³³ *Thallóczy*, VIII/7. 303–304.
- ³⁴ *Thallóczy*, IX/1. 533.
- ³⁵ *Thallóczy*, IX/1. 535.
- ³⁶ *Thallóczy*, IX/1. 544.
- ³⁷ *Thallóczy*, VIII/7. 300.
- ³⁸ *Thallóczy*, VIII/7. 307.
- ³⁹ *Thallóczy*, VIII/7. 303, 320–329, 254
- ⁴⁰ *Thallóczy*, VIII/7. 306.
- ⁴¹ *Thallóczy*, IX/1. 511.
- ⁴² *Thallóczy*, VIII/8. 378.
- ⁴³ *Thallóczy*, VIII/8. 381.
- ⁴⁴ *Thallóczy*, VIII/8. 365.
- ⁴⁵ *Thallóczy*, VIII/6. 264, VIII/8. 380. Financiers refused to give the required 950 million francs credit to the Hungarian and Austrian Minister of Finances for mobilization. *Thallóczy*, VIII/8. 353.
- ⁴⁶ *Thallóczy*, XI/1. 486.
- ⁴⁷ *Thallóczy*, VIII/7. 309.
- ⁴⁸ *Thallóczy*, XI/1. 311. 07.11.1912.
- ⁴⁹ *Thallóczy*, VIII/8. 380–381.
- ⁵⁰ *Thallóczy*, VIII/8. 383.
- ⁵¹ *Thallóczy*, VIII/8. 358. 10.12.1912.
- ⁵² *Thallóczy*, XI/1. 406.
- ⁵³ *Thallóczy*, XI/1. 430. 10.02.1913.
- ⁵⁴ *Thallóczy*, XI/1. 398–400. 09.01.1913.
- ⁵⁵ *Thallóczy*, XI/1. 432. 12.02.1913.
- ⁵⁶ *Thallóczy*, XI/1. 455.
- ⁵⁷ *Thallóczy*, XI/2. 557. 06.06.1913.
- ⁵⁸ For Tarnowski's opinion see: Деметер, Г.: Опитите на България да избегне изолацията в навечерието на Междусъюзническата война. Исторически преглед, 2012/5–6.
- ⁵⁹ *Thallóczy*, XI/2. 578–580.
- ⁶⁰ *Mach, R. von*: Aus bewegter Balkanzeit, 1879–1918. Berlin, 1928, 235.
- ⁶¹ *Bourgeois, E.–Pagés, G.*: Die Ursachen und Verantwortlichkeiten des Großen Krieges. Hrsg. u. Übersetzung: Schwertfeger, B. Berlin, 1922. 356.
- ⁶² HHStA. Ad. Reg. F. 23. Kt. 64. 05.17. 1913. Berchtold an Tarnowski és Popper an Fanta, cited by Löding, D.: Deutschlands und Österreich–Ungarns Balkanpolitik von 1912–14.

unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Ihrer Wirtschaftsinteresse. Hamburg, 1969. (Phil. Diss.).
 “Erkundigt Euch sehr vorsichtig, wieviel Geld Bulgarien brauchen würde, um gegen Serbien kräftig aufzutreten und wenn nötig auch den Krieg zu führen.”, 81.

⁶³ *Thallóczy*, IX/1. 500. 19.04.1913.

⁶⁴ Burián did not count on Russian intervention, because he supposed that Russia would never oppose Bulgaria as it is a Slavic state – wrote *Thallóczy*.

⁶⁵ *Thallóczy* called this a policy of adventurers – but from the text it is not clear whether he meant the Austrian offer, or the Bulgarian behavior towards Serbia.

⁶⁶ *Thallóczy*, XI/1. 531–532.

⁶⁷ *Thallóczy*, XI/1. 536–537.

⁶⁸ *Thallóczy*, XI/1. 542.

⁶⁹ *Thallóczy* also pointed out that Romania betrayed the Triple Alliance by his attack on Bulgaria. *Thallóczy*, 581.

⁷⁰ *Thallóczy*, XI/2. 581. 04.07.1913.

⁷¹ *Conrad von Hötzendorf, F.*: Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906–1918. Wien, Leipzig, München, 1922. III, 353.

⁷² HHStA Nachlass Baernreither, Kt. 8. Tagebücher, 1913. 11. 23. Wien, and Löding, D., 81.
 “Österreich habe Bulgarien darin bestärkt Serbien anzugreifen, und Bulgarien habe Gründe gehabt auf österreichische Hilfe zu rechnen...” – wrote Tzar Ferdinánd.

⁷³ For the role of Tschirschky see *Деметер, Г.*: Опитите на България да избегне изолацията в навечерието на Междусъюзническата война. Исторически преглед, 2012/5–6.